Security announcements | Moodle.org

External API access to Quiz overrides contained insufficient access control.

Some hidden user profile fields were visible in gradebook reports, which could result in some users without the "view hidden user fields" capability having access to the information.

Additional localstorage validation was required to mitigate a cache poisoning risk.

When creating an export of site administration presets, some sensitive secrets/keys were not being excluded from the export, which could result in them being unintentionally leaked if the presets were shared with a third party.

Insufficient sanitizing in the TeX notation filter resulted in an arbitrary file read risk on sites where pdfTeX is available (such as those with TeX Live installed).

Additional restrictions were required to avoid a remote code execution risk in calculated question types. (Note: This required the capability to add/update questions.)

Hi All,

Some of you may have seen from various outlets that a vulnerability has been identified in the “polyfill.js” library and particularly the hosted version of that library (cdn.polyfill.io). This is a popular open source library that is used in many sites to add various javascript support features to older web browsers. 

In light of this new vulnerability we have conducted a review of our Moodle products, associated moodle.org and moodle.com sites as well as our Moodle Cloud sites. We can confirm that our systems are not affected by this issue. We do not use this library in our product codebase or in the code of our company sites.

As a point of clarification the Moodle LMS codebase does include a file named `polyfill.js`, which might raise concerns due to the similarity in names. However, we assure you that this file is entirely unrelated to the vulnerability identified, and is just a coincidence.

We take security very seriously. Our team continuously monitors for new threats and vulnerabilities, ensuring that our products remain secure and reliable. We have robust processes in place to assess and mitigate any potential risks swiftly and effectively.

More information on this exploit can be found at https://polykill.io/ and this Sansec article provides a good overview.

Kind Regards,
Matt Porritt
Head of Platform Solutions.

A unique key should be generated for a user's QR login key and their auto-login key, so the same key cannot be used interchangeably between the two.

Incorrect CSRF token checks resulted in multiple CSRF risks.

The cURL wrapper in Moodle retained the original request headers when following redirects, so HTTP authorization header information could be unintentionally sent in requests to redirect URLs.